Lara Kajs
Dispatches from the Field — The Genocide Report
Washington, DC — 26 October 2026
Ethiopia’s northern war has reignited less than four years after the November 2022 Pretoria Agreement ended large-scale fighting between federal forces and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). Renewed hostilities in September 2026 spread across Tigray, Amhara, and Afar, while a diplomatic rupture with Eritrea heightened concerns about a wider regional confrontation. The renewed violence exposes the fragility of a peace process that left key political, territorial, and security disputes unresolved. This dispatch examines the agreement’s breakdown, the armed actors shaping the conflict, the consequences for civilians, and the implications for stability across the Horn of Africa.
The Collapse of the Pretoria Agreement
Signed on 2 November 2022 in South Africa under African Union mediation, the Pretoria Agreement established a permanent cessation of hostilities between the Ethiopian federal government and the TPLF. Its provisions addressed disarmament, humanitarian access, and a political process intended to support the restoration of peace. A follow-up implementation agreement was signed ten days later, and an interim administration for Tigray was established in March 2023.
The agreement created an essential opportunity to reduce violence, but its implementation remained incomplete. Eritrea and Amhara regional forces, both heavily involved in the preceding war, were not signatories. Disputes over territory, the return of displaced people, and Tigray’s political and security arrangements persisted. Hundreds of thousands of people remained displaced from Western Tigray, where Amhara forces and militias retained control of contested areas. The Tigrayan administration also faced substantial challenges in restoring public services.
These unresolved issues were compounded by renewed political and military tensions. In January 2026, the UN human rights office reported intensified clashes between the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) and Tigrayan regional forces, including the use of drones and artillery. Both sides were also reportedly arresting people based on perceived affiliations. Hostilities escalated further in September. On 22-23 September, fighting spread across Tigray, Amhara, and Afar, prompting the UN Secretary-General to warn of a rapidly deteriorating situation and the risk of a broader conflict. Reports of attacks on strategic infrastructure and the expansion of hostilities underscored how quickly the security situation was deteriorating. The parties have accused one another of violating the 2022 agreement.
“The Pretoria Agreement ended a war, but it did not resolve the disputes that produced it.”
A Reader’s Guide to the Armed Actors
The number of armed groups involved in the current conflict, combined with shifting alliances, complicates both civilian protection and accountability. Federal forces include the ENDF and its air arm, while the government has also received support from Amhara regional forces and the Tigray Peace Force, a faction opposed to the TPLF.
Opposing the federal government is a coalition formed around the TPLF. According to its founding statement, the alliance includes several other regional and opposition movements, among them the Amhara Fano National Movement, the Oromo Liberation Army, the Obaden National Liberation Front, the Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front, and movements from Benishangul-Gumuz. These groups have distinct political objectives and regional grievances; their participation in a common coalition does not establish that they share a unified command structure or a common political program.
The alignments also reflect a history of shifting partnerships. Eritrea fought alongside federal forces during the 2020-2022 war, but Addis Ababa now accuses Eritrea of supporting the opposition alliance. Fano militias, many of which previously aligned with the federal government, are now engaged in conflict with it. Meanwhile, the Tigray Peace Force has opposed the TPLF and aligned with federal forces.
These changing relationships complicate efforts to identify chains of command, attribute alleged violations, and negotiate local ceasefires. They also reinforce the need to assess each armed actor according to its conduct and responsibilities rather than assuming that former alliances or current political alignments determine responsibility.
Why Ethiopia Matters
Ethiopia’s stability has consequences well beyond its borders. With a population of approximately 130 million, the country is a major political and economic actor in the Horn of Africa and hosts the African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa. Its internal security also affects regional trade, cross-border displacement, and relations among neighboring states.
Two broader disputes heighten the risk of escalation. Ethiopia’s pursuit of reliable access to the Red Sea has intensified tensions with Eritrea, which became independent in 1993 and controls a substantial stretch of the coastline. The dispute intersects with questions of sovereignty, regional security, and the strategic importance of maritime access.
Ethiopia’s relations with Egypt are also strained by the dispute over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and the management of Nile waters. These issues are distinct from fighting in Tigray, but they contribute to a regional environment in which competing security interests can complicate diplomatic efforts to contain conflict. The renewed fighting therefore threatens more than Ethiopia’s internal stability. It places additional pressure on regional diplomacy at a time when neighboring states are already confronting serious political and humanitarian challenges.
Regional Spillover
The risk of regional escalation is particularly acute along the Eritrean frontier. Relations between Addis Ababa and Asmara have deteriorated sharply, and Eritrea has severed diplomatic relations with Ethiopia. Reports that Eritrean troops crossed into Ethiopia near Zalambessa and came under drone attack have heightened concern, although Eritrea denies that its forces entered Tigray. The UN Secretary-General has separately expressed concern about reports of Eritrean forces being present in Ethiopia and called on regional states to avoid actions that could intensify the conflict.
Ethiopia has also accused Egypt and Sudan of supporting Tigrayan forces. Both governments deny involvement. These allegations remain distinct from independently established evidence of participation and should be assessed accordingly. The conflict nevertheless carries risks for Sudan, where the ongoing war has produced a severe humanitarian emergency and extensive displacement. A broader regional confrontation could intensify insecurity along borders, complicate humanitarian operations, and expose additional civilian populations to violence. Ethiopia’s longstanding tensions with Somalia, including disputes related to access to the sea, add another dimension to an already fragile regional security environment.
Regional spillover is not inevitable. Its prevention depends in part on diplomatic engagement, restraint by neighboring states, and a clear distinction between verified military involvement and political allegations.
Civilian Protection, Displacement, and Humanitarian Access
The population entering this renewed phase of fighting was already facing the consequences of the 2020-2022 war. The United Nations estimates that the earlier conflict displaced more than two million people, with approximately one million remaining internally displaced.
On 25 September 2026, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk raised concerns about reported ENDF airstrikes, including drone strikes, that allegedly hit five schools in Tigray on 22 September, causing deaths and injuries. He also condemned reports of forced mass recruitment by the TPLF, including the recruitment of children, as well as killings, torture, arbitrary detention, forced displacement, and reprisals against people who resisted recruitment and their families. His office also cited reports of arbitrary conscription by government forces, communications disruptions in Mekelle and parts of Amhara, and road blockages in Afar.
These allegations require independent investigation. Attacks affecting schools, the recruitment and use of children by armed forces or groups, and abuses against people in detention raise serious concerns under international humanitarian and human rights law. Responsibility must be established on the basis of evidence, with the same standards applied to every party.
Humanitarian operations have also been disrupted. The UN has reported attacks affecting humanitarian personnel, assets, and premises, while armed groups have seized humanitarian vehicles in parts of the country. Road closures and deteriorating security have interrupted planned movements and restricted access to people in need. A government-led effort to facilitate returns from Kobo was suspended after security conditions worsened.
These disruptions are particularly concerning in areas where displacement, damaged infrastructure, and limited access to essential services have already weakened civilian resilience. Humanitarian organizations have warned that needs are increasing while below-average rainfall is adding pressure to vulnerable communities. The UN has stated that it is prepared to resume operations in the northern regions when safe access can be assured.
Humanitarian access must not be treated as a secondary consideration in military or political negotiations. Civilians displaced by earlier fighting face renewed risks, while those newly affected by the escalation require protection and assistance. Preventing further displacement and ensuring safe, sustained humanitarian access are essential to limiting the consequences of renewed hostilities.
Accountability and the Unresolved Record
The current escalation must be understood against the documented record of the earlier war. The International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia, established by the UN Human Rights Council, investigated violations and abuses committed by multiple parties. Its reports in 2022 and 2023 documented serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, including conduct that the Commission found amounted to war crimes and, in some instances, crimes against humanity.
The Commission’s mandate ended in 2023 after the Human Rights Council did not renew it. The absence of a comparable independent international investigative mechanism has limited the continuity of international scrutiny. Although the Pretoria Agreement included commitments relating to transitional justice, accountability for the violations documented during the earlier conflict remains incomplete.
This unresolved record matters to the present crisis. Where serious violations have not been credibly investigated, and accountability remains limited, the conditions that enable abuses may persist. Renewed hostilities create further risks, but they also make independent documentation more difficult as access deteriorates and communications are disrupted.
The same evidentiary standard must apply to every party. Reports of strikes affecting schools, recruitment of children, arbitrary detention, attacks on humanitarian operations, and forced displacement require impartial investigation, regardless of who is alleged to be responsible. Allegations should not be treated as established findings before the evidence has been assessed, but neither should uncertainty become a reason to abandon documentation.
The role of external actors also warrants scrutiny. States and companies involved in arms transfers have responsibilities under applicable international and domestic law, including relevant rules governing arms transfers and the risk that supplied weapons may be used ot commit or facilitate serious violations. These obligations should be assessed on the basis of the applicable legal framework and the information available concerning the recipient and intended use.
Accountability is not separate from peacebuilding. It is part of the process through which violations are investigated, responsibility is established, and the conditions for renewed abuses are addressed.
Atrocity Prevention Lens
Ethiopia’s renewed fighting illustrates how unresolved violations, displacement, impunity, and the erosion of civilian protections can combine to heighten atrocity risk. The absence of sustained independent scrutiny following the earlier war, alongside reports of renewed attacks affecting civilians, forced recruitment, arbitrary detention, and restrictions on humanitarian access, underscores the need for early warning and impartial monitoring. Prevention requires preserving evidence, identifying patterns of abuse, protecting humanitarian access, and responding to credible indicators before further escalation makes civilian protection more difficult. These measures must apply consistently to every party, regardless of political alignment or military power.
Legal Framework
International Humanitarian Law
The four Geneva Conventions of 1949, Common Article 3, Additional Protocol II, and applicable customary international humanitarian law establish protections for people not taking part in hostilities and regulate the conduct of parties to armed conflict. The rules include the prohibition of murder, torture, cruel treatment, and outrages upon personal dignity; protections for civilians and civilian objects; and obligations governing humanitarian relief. Ethiopia is a party to Additional Protocol II, which supplements Common Article 3 in qualifying non-international armed conflicts.
Civilian Protection and the Conduct of Hostilities
The principles of distinction, proportionality, and precautions in attack are central to the protection of civilians under international humanitarian law. Parties must distinguish between civilians and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives. Attacks directed against civilians and civilian objects are prohibited, as are indiscriminate attacks and attacks expected to cause excessive incidental civilian harm in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. Special protections apply to medical units, humanitarian personnel, and objects indispensable to civilian survival under the applicable rules.
International Human Rights Law
International human rights law continues to apply during armed conflict, subject to the applicable rules governing the relationship between human rights law and international humanitarian law. Relevant instruments include the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention Against Torture. They establish protections against arbitrary deprivation of life, torture, and arbitrary detention, alongside obligations relating to effective remedies and fair treatment. Any restrictions on rights must meet the requirements of the applicable legal framework.
Individual Criminal Responsibility and Command Responsibility
Individuals may be held criminally responsible for war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide where the legal elements of the relevant offense are established. Command responsibility may arise when a commander or other superior with the requisite authority and effective control knew, or under the applicable standard had reason to know, of crimes committed by subordinates and failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent or repress them or submit the matter to competent authorities. The precise standard depends on the applicable legal regime.
United Nations Charter and Regional Peace and Security
The UN Charter prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of states, subject to the Charter’s recognized exceptions. It also establishes the independence of states subject to the Charter’s recognized exceptions. It also establishes the Security Council’s primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. The African Union’s Constitutive Act and its peace and security framework provide regional mechanisms for conflict prevention, mediation, and the promotion of peace and stability.
Suggestion Citation
Kajs, Lara. “From Pretoria to Renewed War: Ethiopia’s Collapsing Peace and the Horn of Africa.” Dispatches from the Field. The Genocide Report. Washington, DC, 22 October 2026
Photo Credit
Debark IDP by UNICEF Ethiopia. License under CC BY-NC-ND 2.0.
About TGR
The Genocide Report (TGR) publishes analysis and educational resources on conflict, international law, and atrocity prevention. Its work seeks to bridge academic research, field realities, and public understanding of mass violence and civilian protection.
About the Author
Lara Kajs is the founder and executive director of The Genocide Report, a Washington, DC-based educational nonprofit focused on atrocity prevention and international law. She is the author of several field-based books on conflict, displacement, humanitarian crises, and international humanitarian law, drawing on extensive research and field experience in Yemen, Syria, and Afghanistan. Her writing and public speaking focus on atrocity crimes and forced displacement